Abstract
Introduction
Since the 1950s, when communication researchers for the first time became disenchanted with effect analysis as a way of understanding the social impact of the media, several perspectives have been developed to improve or replace the initial effect or media centered theory. The 'Uses and Gratifications' perspective (in the following: U and G) has gained a special place among these alternatives as one of the most widely used (Bryant and Miron, 2004) . During the last five years, it may have lost some ground to theories that are primarily used to deal with the content and impact of mediated messages such as framing theory, cultivation analysis, and the agenda setting approach. Yet, one can confidently say that U and G is still the standard perspective for studying audience activity, and that it is likely to remain so in the coming years (Ruggiero, 2000) . Given this sustained interest by the community of communication researchers, it seems useful to contribute to the continuing critical reflection on U and G. More specifically, we will discuss the way in which U and G conceptualizes human action. Based on this discussion, we will suggest improvements to U and G theory and methods, with special reference to event history analysis as a valuable tool for overcoming shortcomings in U and G methodology.
According to Bryant and Miron, U and G's year of birth is 1959. In that year Bernard Berelson claimed that communication research appeared to be dead, and Elihu Katz responded that research 'should move from what media do to people (persuasion) to what people do with the media' (Katz, 1959: 686) . However, to date back the origins of U and G to 1959 is somewhat questionable. One can even go back to early gratification studies such as Herzog (1944) . However, in our view, the institutionalization of U and G as a distinct research tradition took place only in the 1970s. This was when the label 'Uses and Gratifications', some formalized assumptions, and some typical research practices met each other and gained a following.
Economic thinking evidently played a critical role in the establishment of U and G as an intstitutionalized approach. In 1968, Lundberg and Hultèn Ϫ economic psychologists by training (SSE, 2006 a, b ) Ϫ defined a 'Uses and Gratifications' model in terms of a number of theoretical assumptions. Five of these assumptions were cited by Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1973, 1974) in their classic essay about 'utilization of mass communication by the individual'. These assumptions were that '(1) The audience is conceived of as active, that is, an important part of mass media use is assumed to be goal directed (...); (2) much initiative in linking need gratification and media choice lies with the audience member (...); (3) the media compete with other sources of need satisfaction (...); (4) many of the goals of mass media use can be derived from data supplied by individual audience members (...); (5) value judgments about the cultural significance of mass communications should be suspended while audience orientations are explored on their own terms (...)' (Katz et al., 1974: 21Ϫ22) .
In the same contribution, Katz et al. posed that only 'expectations' with respect to mass media and other resources were to be seen as the immediate causes of 'media exposure (or engagement in other activities)' (Katz et al., 1974: 20) . The way in which these expectations were measured, were largely similar to the way Lundberg and Hultèn (1968) proposed. This meant that on the one hand people were asked to indicate the importance of have a specific 'need' fulfilled (e. g., 'How important is it for you to keep up with the way the government performs its functions?') and on the other hand how the media were helpful in this respect (e. g., 'How much does listening to the radio help you to keep up with the way the government performs its functions?'). This operationalization of expectations closely resembles operationalizations of motivational factors in theories about decision-making in which expectancy value (EV) and subjective expected utility (SEU) were central concepts (cf. Edwards, 1954) or of one of the later variants of this family of applied economic theories (e. g., Fishbein, 1963) .
Up to the end of the 1970s the link between U and G and economic theory was not widely recognized however (Palmgreen, Wenner, and Rosengren, 1985) . Consequently, U and G could be criticized for being atheoretical during most of the 1970s. Yet, from then on, several scholars explicitly linked EV/SEU models and U and G and integrated the two approaches (Babrow, 1989; Galloway and Meek, 1981; Rayburn and Palmgreen, 1984; Sepstrup, 1980; Swanson, 1987; Van Leuven, 1981) . So, at least from that moment on, U and G could no longer be considered to be 'basically a very atheoretical approach' (Elliott, 1973: 156) .
Conceptual difficulties
With the integration of EV/SEU theory into models describing audience activity, EV/SEU-like problems were introduced into the field. These problems were partly related to the assumptions of economic models of human conduct about the decision-making process (cf. Edwards, 1954) . Some of these ideas seem to be at odds with common sense ideas concerning media use.
A first assumption in these economic theories is that people act on the basis of complete or adequate information. However, this assumption seems difficult to apply to the field of audience activity, where the central problem is the very act of consulting information (by watching television programs, listening radio broadcasts, reading newspapers, surfing the web, etc.).
An additional assumption of economic theory is that people make rational choices. This would imply that people are able to determine the value or utility of different lines of action, and would decide for that alternative that has highest value or utility. If applied to media use, this assumption is highly problematic as well, because many people seem to use media on the basis of habits in stead of conscious deliberation (Windahl, 1981; Rubin, 1984) .
A third assumption underlying applications of EV/SEU theory in social science is that people have full control over their acts (cf. Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) . In the case of media use this means that they are free to watch, listen, read, anticipate, and recall media related experiences, or to abstain from them. This is a rather unrealistic assumption for a couple of reasons. In the first place, it seems unreasonable to assume that people watch as much television as they want; they have work to do, have to look after children, or have other commitments. Consequently, they are not always 'available' for watching television (cf. Webster and Wakshlag, 1983) or using other media. Another reason why it is unrealistic to assume that people have full control over their media use has to do with the fact that not all people have the skills to use these media in a 'rational', intersubjectively meaningful way. Such meaningful use of the media is not thinkable without being acquainted with the world that is presented/represented by the media and/or being acquainted with the codes of presentation/representation of these media. For instance, it seems that not being acquainted with 'adult affairs' (such as politics and economics) withholds youngsters from picking up the habit of reading newspaper (Barnhurst and Wartella, 1991) . And evidently, semi-literates will find it hard to read a newspaper on a daily basis. A third reason why it is unrealistic to assume that people have full control over their media use is they tend to use media in the co-presence of others, who can influence their media use (Ang, 1995) . This has been largely ignored by U and G, which commonly focuses on utilization of mass communication by the individual, instead of media use as collective behavior or social action.
So, the initial U and G perspective was based on an economic theory that can be characterized by three assumptions that have been questioned over the years. In response to this criticism, many 'improvements' to the original model have been suggested and implemented (see Ruggiero, 2000) . This has resulted in a considerable number of differing U and G models. A common trait of these models is that they are rather complex, be it for a reason. "The many arrows and boxes of the model may appear bewildering, but we believe they represent a minimum of concepts and relations (...) if these complex phenomena are to be grasped at all" (Palmgreen et al., 1985: 18) . The increasing complexity of U and G models is also clear from a recent reformulation of its basic assumptions by Rubin (2002) . According to him, U and G now assumes that "media audiences are variably active", that "a host of social and psychological factors guide, filter or mediate communication behavior", that the degree in which media satisfy needs "varies among individuals based on their social and psychological circumstances" and that "people are typically more influential than the media, but not always" (528).
The increasing complexity of U and G has resulted in a shift away from the EV/SEU assumptions of the early days. A fine example of this is the way in which the concept of 'gratifications' was dealt with. Accord-ing to Rayburn (1996) , it was first used predominantly as an antecedent of media use, as 'gratifications sought', which one might see as something equivalent to the 'expected value' or the 'subjective expected utility' of an act of media use. However, during the 1970s, researchers began to emphasize that people do not always get what they want. Hence it was necessary to allow a new concept, that of 'gratifications obtained' to become part of U and G theory (Palmgreen and Rayburn, 1979) . The concept of 'gratifications obtained', however, does not have an equivalent in basic EV/SEU theories Ϫ and for a good reason. The idea of not getting what you want is somewhat at odds with the assumptions about 'ideal' actions as being rational and based on complete information.
This movement away from the straightforward assumptions of the original studies is usually seen as 'systematic progression' (Rubin, 2002: 531) or as refinement of the original perspective (Ruggiero, 2000) . This 'progression' means that a discrepancy has grown between SEU, EV, and other rational choice theories on one hand and the results from empirical U and G studies on the other hand. Of course, this development does not mean that the SEU, EV, or other rational theories have lost their value for the study of audience activity. They still may be useful as providing parsimonious models for the prediction of media use in cases in which media use is responsive to unambiguous rewards (see Koppl and Whitman, 2004 , for the argument). SEU, EV, and other rational choice theories, however, are too limited to account for many other aspects of audience activity in the context of everyday life. Consequently, a more comprehensive theory is needed for creating a more complete picture of audience activity. In the remainder of this article, we will argue that action theories (e. g., Luckmann, 1973, 1989) as applied to the field of communication research in the MASA perspective (Renckstorf, 1996; Renckstorf and Wester, 2004) can be seen as more comprehensive approach of audience activity, and we will discuss methodological implications of this approach.
Action theory and media use
Proposing that audience activity should be studied using some variant of action theory is not a particularly new idea. In 1974 McQuail and Gurevitch said that an approach of audience activity based on Schutzean action theory "has been least adopted, yet (…) it may also hold out most promise for future work' (294). In the years that followed, several scholars made efforts to develop a social action perspective for mass communication research (for an overview, see Renckstorf and McQuail, 1996) . These efforts, however, have not resulted in integration between action theory and the U and G perspective. Action theories (such as social constructivism, symbolic interactionism, and framing theory) are still treated as distinct from U and G (e. g., Bryant and Miron, 2004) . In our view, this is regrettable, because action theory can be used to create a more comprehensive model of audience activity. Such a more comprehensive model is needed, because the initial EV/SEU model underlying the original U and G tradition cannot account for the phenomena studied today under the heading of 'audience activity', and extending the model is not possible without violating the assumptions underlying EV/SEU models.
The assumptions underlying EV/SEU models about action as being based on full information, rational deliberation and full control over the intended action seem to be too restrictive to be successfully applied to the subject of 'audience activity'. Our own objections to a straightforward application of EV/SEU models are based on two considerations. Our first and most fundamental argument is that EV/SEU models are based on a positivistic world view; they assume that people know the world as it is (cf. Littlejohn, 1983 ). This position is not tenable. It seems unreasonable to assume a real world (not even a life-world) which is completely knowable; in which rational deliberation could solve all personal or cultural contingencies, and where people have full control over their actions. Instead, it is far more plausible to assume that images of the life-world must be created by processes of defining situations and interpreting actions and objects (Thomas, 1932; Schutz and Luckmann, 1973; Berger and Luckmann, 1966) ; that these definitions and interpretations are to be seen as neither natural nor permanent, but socially constructed and provisional instead (Blumer, 1969; Wilson, 1970) ; and that the control that actors can exert over their actions is neither complete nor permanent. Human beings are permanently confronted with situations in which solutions have to be developed and methods of response have to be tried out. This may result in some degree of control, but never in full control, because the situational context of action is changing permanently (Wilson, 1970; Renckstorf, 1996) .
A second objection we make against a rigid use of EV/SEU models to account for media use is that such models run the risk of becoming too focused on the subjective experience of individual actors. Though this subjective experience is important, it is obviously not the only thing that deserves attention. There are also factors outside consciousness that influence action, at least that is what actors experience. "In the natural attitude no one would even get the idea that he himself is the whole world. Every child learns sooner or later to recognize the limits that are set for his action; everybody runs into the boundaries of his experience. No one believes that he could return to yesterday, no one leaps over a mountain, no one tries to bring down the moon from the sky. When a man tries to slip into another person's shoes, he fails. And on a given occasion, everyone eventually reaches the conclusion that he too cannot escape death. Such assumptions (…) can be called knowledge of the 'transcendence' of the world" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 102) .
So, according to Schutz and Luckmann, there are unmastered, transcendent elements in the world of everyday life that are reckoned with and that will influence future action. This transcendence is not complete, but neither is control. Individuals find themselves in a mixed situation. The elements of the life-world are "partly imposed on, partly so to speak 'feasible' for, the individual" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 113) . Consequently, we can speak of a partial transcendence of the life-world. It is this partial transcendence of everyday life that is lacking in straightforward applications of EV/SEU models. It is, on the other hand, an integral part of action theory. Consequently, it is possible to improve research into audience activity by using action theoretical ideas.
Straightforward EV/SEU models cannot cope with 'naturalistic settings' in which individuals have no complete mastery over the situations they are part of. Consequently, such models tend to concentrate on the prediction of 'behavioral intentions' (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975) , instead of action itself. This means that some important, socially visible aspects of behavior are ignored. Action is then reduced to an unproblematic picking and choosing of the most attractive behavioral alternative. This means that such research will inevitably offer an incomplete picture of the way in which action takes shape. Action theoretical approaches offer a way out of this one-sidedness by describing how situations are mastered. As a tool for this, Renckstorf (1996) has developed the so called MASA model (earlier presented in Bosman et al., 1989) , spelling out two alternative pathways to mastery of situations. In both pathways, action starts with the perception of a situation. That perception is then assumed to become more focused on elements that are most relevant to the actor ('thematization'). This is followed by a phase during which the actor determines whether s/he has a routine way of dealing with these elements ('diagnostization'). If yes, s/he will apply a routine response to the situation ('external action'). If not, s/he will have to work out a response ('projection') and decide to implement it ('decision'). After that decision has been made, an 'external action' may take place: A new situation emerges with new transcendent elements to be mastered by the actor.
The MASA model can be seen as a basic action theoretical framework for describing separate instances of human action. Often, however, researchers will feel a need to gain broader insight into human action by taking a longer term perspective. In that case, they will have to ignore how mastery of discrete situations takes shape and focus on the larger picture. In such a case the type and level of mastery will be central, not the specific mastery of specific situations. Actional theory also offers conceptual tools for this level of abstraction. It has several concepts such as 'stock of knowledge' and 'structure of relevance' that are directly linked to differences in degree of mastery of situations. Additionally, it offers a description of long term processes that are likely to affect familiarity, control, and valuation of everyday life, such as habituation, routinization, typification, institutionalization, objectivation, and socialization (Berger and Luckmann, 1966) . In short, action theory offers a more comprehensive look at short term and long term factors determining the mastery that people have over their life-world.
A common trait of action theories is that they describe action as processes of mastering situations. It assumes that as this process proceeds in time, mastery changes and so do the unmastered, transcendent elements. From this, we can infer that by describing these changes we can learn more about these unmastered elements. However, temporality is just one source of transcendencies. Another source of unmastered elements in the life-world are the people with whom the actor interacts. "However close we may be to one another, the Other's world necessarily transcends mine" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 109) . These others are further likely to influence the actor's actions including his/her media use. They may influence the actor in a way s/he did not foresee. This is also true for media use by the actor, which is often realized in co-presence of others, who Ϫ as said earlier Ϫ have an influence on the media use as well (Ang, 1995) .
The consequence of the presence of transcendent elements in the lifeworld means we cannot be too sure that expectancies, values, and subjective utilities abstracted from real life situations will be very successful in the prediction of action. The actor and his or her mastery of a situation differ from situation to situation. Or to put it differently, action is conditioned by the situation-bound preferences, problems, and solutions. In the pre-preparation stage, aspects of the situation may condition motivation by imposing some thematic relevance. During the actual preparation of an action, the actor has to reckon with "the pressure of action and time in an actually present situation" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 47) . The same holds for the execution stage of action. "The everyday life-world is the region of reality in which man can engage himself and which he can change … At the same time, the objectivities in this realm (including the acts and the results of actions of other men) limit his free possibilities of action. They place him up against obstacles that can be surmounted, as well as barriers that are insurmountable" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1973: 3) .
By taking the unmastered situational context of action into consideration, the MASA perspective transcends some limitations of U and G theory. It recognizes that in some situations, the solution to a subjective problem may simply be to activate a routine response, for example, turning on the television, perhaps even regardless of the program. It recognizes that in other situations, responses may be quite different. "Mass media and their messages are (…) objects (…) for (acting) individuals which they first observe and perceive and then, depending on the situation, thematize and diagnose" (Renckstorf, 1996: 27) . And part of that situation can be the co-presences of others, the "actual and potential patterns of social action and interaction" (Renckstorf, 1996: 28 ) that coshape viewing, listening, or viewing respectively.
Methodological implications
In the preceding we have presented our view on the difficulties in U and G, and the solutions that action theory might offer. The main difference between an EV/SEU based theory of media use (of which some early versions of U and G provided some clear examples) and an action theoretical theory (such as the MASA model discussed in our text) is located in the issue of goal attainment (including and the role of media use in it). Although both approaches emphasize that actors aim at achieving some goal, they disagree on how problematic goal attainment is in the context of everyday life. In EV/SEU, goal achievement is seen as rather unproblematic, because the individual is granted almost full mastery over situations. In action theoretical approaches, goal achievement is assumed to be far more difficult. Situations are seen as partially transcendent; they are not mastered beforehand. In action theory, mastery is something to be achieved by both short-term processes (e. g., implementing a new solution) and by long-term processes (e. g., accumulation of routines). Moreover, it is assumed that each situation brings its own relevancies, problems, and solutions with it. The presence or absence of others is likely to contribute considerably to the way in which situations are mastered.
The aforementioned considerations have many consequences for the way in which action in general and media use in particular should be studied. But before entering into that, it should again be emphasized that there is also much common ground between an EV/SEU inspired approach such as U and G and the action theoretical MASA approach. Both approaches emphasize that individuals make use of the media because of the benefits associated with it, and both assume that cognitive processes are a key ingredient in the preparation of action. Consequently, researchers from both traditions are faced with the task of reconstructing mental states and processes leading up to media use, either by means of introspective techniques, or by applying inferential methods (Hendriks Vettehen, Renckstorf, and Wester, 1996; Renckstorf and Wester, 2004) .
There is, however, a considerable difference in ideas about how introspection and inference can be carried out. In EV/SEU approaches such as U and G, the tendency is rather strong to abstract media use from its time and space bound context. Actional theoretical approaches such as MASA, in contrast, tend to pay more attention to action as a process that proceeds over time, and as something that takes place in a specific situation, a specific place and a specific social context. This different emphasis has considerable methodological repercussions. The first is, of course, that action theorist should stress that data should be gathered by means of techniques that allow action to be studied as something that proceeds over time, as something that starts, continues and ends.
The classic example of this way gathering and describing such data is the case study, which can be defined as an in-depth, longitudinal examination of a single instance or event (Davey, 1991) . According to Wilbur Schramm (quoted in Yin, 2003: 12) "the essence of a case study (…) is that it tries to illuminate a decision or set of decisions: Why they were taken, how they were implemented, and with what result". In such a case study, several research techniques can be employed, such as the time line interview, protocol analysis, thought listing and thinking aloud techniques (Cacioppo, Von Hippel, and Ernst, 1997; Dervin, 1989; Ericsson and Simon, 1984; Van Someren, Barnard, and Sandberg, 1994; Schaap, Renckstorf, and Wester, 2005) .
Studying action as a process that develops over time is, however, not necessarily the prerogative of qualitative research. Quantitative techniques such as panel analysis, cohort analysis, and time series analysis may also reveal processual aspects of action. They are, however, limited techniques because usually they either consist of a limited number of observations per person (panel analysis) or they are applied to aggregated, non-individualized data (cohort analysis, time series analysis). So, for studying action as a process by which some person tries to deal with some situation, these designs are not particularly well-suited. For these purposes, however, discrete-time event history analysis seems appropriate (Allison, 1984; Yaffee, Austin, and Hinkle, 1994; Westerik, Renckstorf, Wester, and Lammers, 2004) .
In discrete-time event history analysis (or discrete-time survival analysis) the focus of the researcher is on the occurrence and timing of an event. For each individual, multiple observations are made. Classic applications of event history analysis are in the field of medicine, were it is often used to analyze factor related to the occurrence of death or illness. An example from this field may clarify the basic concepts of this analytical technique.
If the 'event' to be predicted is death, and researchers choose to predict the chances of death for every single year after a person is born, then one ends up with 1 observation (death) for those who died for their first birthday, 2 observations (life, death) for those who died being 1 year old, 3 observations (life, life, death) for those who died being 2 years old. In event history analysis, these observations are called personperiods. For each person-period, research shows whether an event took place. Usually, however, researchers gather more information. They often want to know what makes events happen, and thus data on predictor variables are gathered. These variables can be time-invariant; such variables are constants within individuals (in our example gender, race, year of birth and birth weight could be such time-invariant variables). Other variables Ϫ the time-varying ones Ϫ may have a different value for every observed year (In our present example age, actual weight and household income could be such time-varying variables). Using discretetime event history analysis, the effect of all time-invariant and timevarying predictors on the criterion variable can be established simultaneously. Additionally, one can model interaction effects. In our example, this could mean that one could test the proposition that gender moderates the effects of age on the chances of dying.
The above described technique of event history analysis has seldom been used in the field of communication research (e. g., Zhu and Weaver, 1989; Westerik et al., 2005) , even though it has clearly some potential for clarifying important issues in communication research (Snyder, 1991 ). Yet, it seems obvious that it could be easily used in this domain to test the utility of ideas about media use as a process embedded in specific situations. In that case, of course, the event to be predicted will not be that of death, but most likely that of initiation or termination of media use (or other activities). If so employed, discrete-time event history analysis can help to portray media use as an integral part of everyday life. It can show how human action is dynamically responding to problems in relation to changing circumstances. At the same time, it could show how small projects of action (such as particular instances of media use) can be understood as an embedded part of a "daily plans and (…) overarching longer-term plans" (Schutz and Luckmann, 1989: 31) .
In this way, discrete-time event history analysis can help to investigate several of the unsolved questions within communication research. One of these questions is how the idea of conscious audience activity as it is emphasized with U and G can be reconciled with notions of more routine audience activity as highlighted in research on audience duplication and audience flow (Cooper, 1996) . Discrete-time event history analysis can serve both approaches, because it can simultaneously deal with the temporal phenomena from flow and duplication research and the more static person bound concepts from gratifications research. To give an example, one can predict someone's television initiation at day x on the basis of his/her television use the day(s) before (thereby revealing the influence of routines, including 'repeat viewing') while at the same time taking into account influences from time-invariant variables such as gratifications sought from television viewing in general.
When applied to time-use diaries and similar time budget data, discrete-time event history analysis can help to further investigate the way in which people influence each other. For instance, it is well-known that children's viewing styles and preferences are influenced by their parents (e. g., Heeter et al., 1988) . But in order to find out how this parental influence takes place additional research is needed. Is heavy viewing the result of watching a lot of television together, is it the result of a lack of supervision, or is it due to lacking alternatives? Such questions can only be answered by means of research that takes the viewing situation (as recorded by means of time use diary) into account. For the research questions posed here, event history analysis of matched diaries of family members may very well yield relevant answers.
And finally, discrete-time event history analysis may shed light on questions pertaining to media 'effects'. If it is true that television viewing facilitates communication with household members (Lull, 1980) , then it seems relevant to establish whether an activated television set increases the chances of a conversation starting. Or if television viewing inhibits civic participation, as Putnam (1995) has hypothesized, then one could analyze whether television viewing effectively blocks social participation. In testing such propositions, discrete-time event history analysis may prove to be very useful.
In short, discrete-time event history analysis can be useful as a technique to portray media use as something that is conceived of as social action that proceeds through time and is embedded in time bound situations. By considering the role played by such situational aspects of media use, and by paying attention to way in which people influence each others media use, communication research can go beyond the limits of the early versions of gratifications research.
